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The Equity Premium:
101 Years of Empirical Evidence from the UK.
Abstract:
We examine the UK equity premium over more than a century using dividend growth to estimate expectations of capital gains employing the approach of Fama and French (2002) . Since 1951 estimated equity premia implied by dividend growth have been much lower than that produced by average stock returns for the UK market as a whole; a finding corroborated by almost every industry sub-sector. Our empirical analysis suggests this is primarily due to a declining discount rate, during the latter part of the 20 th Century, which would rationally stimulate unanticipated equity price rises during this period. Thus, we conclude that historical stock returns over recent decades have been above investors' expectations.
INTRODUCTION 'The Equity Premium is perhaps the single most important number in financial
economics ' remarks Welch (2000, p. 501) . The Equity Premium, the reward in terms of the extra return that investors demand for holding risky assets rather than risk-free assets, has numerous applications in finance from investment appraisal to portfolio asset allocation and from cost of capital estimation to investment performance evaluation. Nevertheless, Welch (2000) notes there is no consensus upon how the equity premium should be estimated.
Probably the most popular method of estimating the equity premium is to use historical realised excess returns observed ex-post. However, the magnitude of this ex-post equity premium of 6% p.a. cannot be reconciled with the theoretical prediction of less than 1% p.a.
from the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model as demonstrated by Mehra and Prescott (1985) . Hence an equity premium of the enormity observed historically is deemed to be a puzzle.
A weakness of using ex-post returns is that it relies upon the assumption that investors' expected returns in the long run and on average will equal realised returns. This assumption has been challenged, specifically with regard to the Equity Premium; perhaps the expectations of investors might not be adequately described by the observed return series. Rietz (1988) asserts that historical data fails to account for the probability of economic catastrophes or disaster scenarios which would be incorporated into rational investors' expectations. Whereas Brown et al. (1995) point out that since the US market didn't experience a significant interruption during the 20 th Century unlike many other financial centres, historical risk estimates in the US are biased downwards. However, since bondholders appear to suffer as much if not more than equityholders during such scenarios these hypotheses fail to provide an adequate explanation for the equity premium puzzle.
An alternative method to estimate equity premia and to examine expected returns more directly is to use fundamentals such as dividends in order to estimate the expected return investors' could anticipate (Jagannathan et al., (2001) and Fama and French, (2002) ). Jaganathan et al. (2001) using the Gordon discounted dividend model 1 claim that since 1970 the expected equity premium has only been about 0.7% p.a, defining the premia as equity returns in excess of long-term government bonds. Fama and French (2002) also use a dividend-based model that implies an expected equity premia over commercial paper of about 2.5% for 1951-2000 rather than the 7.5% average historical return received during this period.
These empirical analyses suggest that in the US, realised returns have been substantially above the expected returns implied by fundamentals during the latter part of the 20 th Century.
An implication of this is that the ex-ante equity premium may be considerably smaller than the 6% indicated by ex-post returns. However, there appears to be a second puzzle. Why have realised returns been so far above the expected returns implied by these dividend growth models?
The motivation of this study is threefold. Firstly, we provide estimates of the expected UK equity premia implied by fundamentals using data covering the entirety of the 20 th Century.
We use the dividend growth model approach outlined by Fama and French (2002) to derive this estimate of expected returns and compare our results with the historical ex-post returns received by investors. This paper contributes to the literature examining the equity premium outside of the US market spanning the whole of the 20 th Century, for which there is currently a dearth of empirical research. A notable exception is Dimson et al. (2003) who focussing purely on realised returns provide some international evidence. In contrast, our focus is on expected returns and any discrepancy between realised returns and expected returns.
We extend our analysis to consider the industry dynamic of realised and expected returns, an aspect that seems to have been overlooked in previous studies. The importance of industrylevel data is that it can give an indication of how widely observed and representative the market results are. Although we are restricted by data availability to a post-1965 analysis of industry returns, we do they find they lend considerable and widespread support to our main findings at the market level that historical returns have been above investors' expectations.
1 The Discounted Dividend Model and the Fama-French Dividend Growth model are identical but are stimulated from different frameworks.
Our method of estimating expected returns, the Fama-French dividend growth model, we propose can be more appropriately applied in the context of the UK market than the US. This is because American corporations seem to have made substantial changes to their dividend payout policy, which could affect the model results. Recent research by Grullon and Michaely (2002) has documented that since the 1970's: a) The US dividend payout ratio has declined substantially and b) Share repurchases by US firms have become an increasingly important means to distribute funds to shareholders. Such changes in payout policy could induce a downward bias upon equity premia estimates implied by dividend growth. However, these trends do not appear to have been mirrored in Britain. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) present evidence that until the late 1990's share repurchases by UK firms were negligible, while Ap Gwilym et al. (2004) document that the UK aggregate payout ratio in December 2001 was above its historical average for 1962-2001. Consequently, the UK market is particularly well suited for the implementation of the dividend growth model.
In light of this we examine in the context of more than 100 years of UK data if there is a disparity between the historical realised equity premium and the equity premium implied by dividends. The finding in this study that realised returns have been above expected returns implied by fundamentals raises important issues as to its source. Campbell (1991) demonstrates that any deviations of realised returns from expectations can be prescribed to either a change in expected dividend growth or a change in expected returns or both.
Secondly and consequently, the predictability of dividend growth is an important issue.
Revisions in expectations of future dividend growth could potentially provide an explanation for the discrepencies between expected returns and realised returns uncovered by our investigation of the equity premium in Section 3. Dividend growth predictability has received relatively little attention in the literature, notable exceptions in the context of the US market are Ang (2002) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) . We firstly establish which factors are related to UK dividend growth in-sample, before extending our analysis to consider out-ofsample forecasting. However, we find very little evidence that future dividend growth can be expected to be above its historical average. Century are lower than past realised returns (see e.g. Claus and Thomas, 2001 and Arnott and Bernstein, 2002) . We provide additional evidence on this issue by investigating if there has been a structural break in the market and industry dividend-price ratios. The dividend-price ratio not only contains important information regarding the income yielded by portfolios.
Moreover, it has also been an important variable for predicting future returns and thus capital gains as first documented by Fama and French (1988) and Campell and Shiller (1988) . Thus, we contend our findings of a downward shift in the dividend-price ratio are indicative that expected returns have fallen.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION (i) Data Description
Our data covering the sample period 1900-2002 is taken from the Barclays Equity-Gilt Study, hereafter referred to as Barclays data. It covers firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. The Barclays equity index for the period 1900-1962 comprises the 30 largest shares by market capitalisation in each year and is rebalanced annually. From 1962-2002 the data is derived from the FTSE All-Share Index. The Barclays equity-price index is valueweighted with the weights of constituent companies being proportional to their market capitalisation. The income yield on the index is derived from all the dividends actually paid by companies during the relevant year divided by the year end price (D t /P t ). In this study we refer to this ratio as the dividend-price ratio. We define the dividend yield as the dividend paid during the current year expressed as a proportion of the prior years price (D t /P t-1 ). In addition to the equity price index and income yield, we also collected by hand from the same source the treasury bill index and cost of living index. We use the cost of living index as a proxy for the consumer price index when calculating inflation on the Barclays dataset.
We supplement our Barclays dataset with data gathered from Datastream which is available from 1966. The Datastream Market index is a value-weighted index that covers the largest 550 firms quoted on the LSE 2 . These 550 firms are split into separate industries and we collect data from the 8 broad industry subsets of the market. These industries cover a vast array of diverse sectors be it services, consumer goods, primary resources or industrial products and also encompasses cyclical and non-cyclical sectors. Consequently our industry dataset is comprehensive and rich, providing us with a broad cross-section for us to make our empirical investigations. Data on the UK consumer price index and treasury bill rate is from the IMF's International Financial Statistics database courtesy of Datastream.
In this study we examine the data in real terms, although our methodology is equally applicable to nominal values. Our preference for real terms stems from the basic tenet of financial theory that investors' primary objective in investing is to transfer consumption from one time period to another; we are not primarily concerned with the nominal monetary value of our assets but rather the consumption stream that this monetary income will entitle us to.
(ii) Methodology for Estimating Returns
We employ the approach of Fama and French (2002) The model relies upon the ratio of the dividends to price being mean-reverting during regimes in order for dividend growth to give appropriate estimates of the capital gain of the share index. More generally, stationarity is an important issue since it is a pre-requisite for regression analysis in order to avoid the possibility of generating spurious regression results (Granger and Newbold, 1974) .
[INSERT FIGURE 1: AROUND HERE]
Our sample covers a period of more than 100 years during which there has been substantial changes to the economic environment within which firms operate. Given the importance of this issue for our model, we utilise a rolling unit root procedure as suggested by Banerjee et al. (1992) to examine the stationarity of the Barclays market dividend-price ratio within sub-periods of our overall sample. Since the dividend-price ratio mean-reverts slowly, we use a rolling 40-year sample window 6 to conduct the Augmented Dickey Fuller test.
[INSERT FIGURE 2: AROUND HERE]
The unit root test statistic values and critical values are plotted through time in figure 2A .
We find that the dividend-price ratio exhibits stationarity during almost all sample periods. 
The results of the rolling unit root tests using the DPDUM series are illustrated in figure   2B . Even with the outlying observations controlled for the pre-1990 data provides support for the data being stationary in all sub-periods. The main differences in the rolling stationarity test results are for periods ending after 1997. Before controlling for the 1974 dividend-price observation we found the data clearly rejected the null at the 5% significance level. However, when the effects of this outlier is controlled for we find evidence that samples ending in 1998 or later are deemed to be non-stationary at the 5% significance level. Thus, the very end of the sample appears to exhibit some behaviour consistent with a random walk. This has perhaps Overall, apart from perhaps the post-1997 data, we find strong evidence that the Barclays market dividend-price ratio is stationary. Given dividends and prices appear to be in a stable long-term relationship, this implies that dividend growth is an appropriate proxy for capital gains and provides confirmation that the Fama-French dividend growth model derived in (2) can be justifiably applied to our dataset.
EQUITY RETURN AND PREMIA ESTIMATES [INSERT TABLE 1: AROUND HERE]
Perhaps the most striking feature of our results is that the UK equity premium from the overall UK market 1951-2002 based on average realised returns was 7.79%, which is more than 65% larger than the estimate of 4.60% from the Dividend Growth model. Over the period 1901-1950, the dividend growth model estimate of the annual UK equity premium of 4.22%, was similar to the 3.49% premium given by the average returns model. Thus both fundamentals and historical returns indicate that the expected equity premium from the turn of the twentieth century to 1950 was about 4% per annum.
Our results indicate that the dividend growth estimate of the equity premium has been relatively stable, being 4.22% p.a. in the first half of the 20 th Century compared with 4.60% p.a. since 1951. While, in contrast, the equity premium from average returns has increased substantially from 3.49% pre-1950 to 7.79% post-1950. Thus, there is a large gap between the dividend growth model estimate and the average return estimate over the second half of the 20 th Century.
[INSERT Table 2 indicates that since 1966 the dividend growth model equity premia estimate has been substantially below that from average returns in all industry subsets, apart from cyclical consumer goods where both estimates are similar. This illustrates that this divergence between the equity premia estimates doesn't appear to be due to unusual behaviour in any particular industry. In contrast, this phenomenon seems to be fairly widespread across almost every broad industry category, which suggests that perhaps a common factor is at work across industries and the market as a whole. Furthermore, in industries where there is a discrepancy the divergence between the equity premium estimates is economically substantial being at least 2.90% p.a. This provides further support for ex-post equity returns having been high since 1966 across a range of economic sectors.
Our two main findings that a) both models yield similar estimates of the equity premium for the pre-1950 era and b) the equity premium from average returns increased substantially in the second half of the 20 th Century are entirely consistent with the Fama and French (2002) study of S&P 500 firms. Table 1 shows that the US equity premium estimates for are almost identical being 4.40% for the average return model and 4.17% dividend growth model. These figures are both around the 4% p.a. level found in this study. They also found the average return model estimate rose dramatically to 7.43% for the post 1951 sample from 4.40% for the earlier period, which is comparable with our results.
However, in one vital aspect our results are different from Fama and French's. In the US the dividend growth model of the equity premium declined substantially in the second half of the 20 th century to 2.55% from 4.17% for their earlier sample. In contrast, we find that this figure remains almost unchanged in the UK being 4.22% for 1901-1950 increasing modestly to 4.60% during 1951-2002. Why are there these differences between the two markets?
Perhaps, this is due to changes in American corporations payout policy which has not been fully mirrored in the UK. Fama and French (2001) demonstrate that the proportion of US firms that pay dividends at all declined substantially in the 1980's and 1990's, whilst Grullon and Michaely (2002) provided evidence that share repurchases have become an important means of distributing funds to shareholders besides dividends. Both these factors could cause US dividend model estimates to be biased downwards.
However, in the UK there is little evidence to support changes in payout policy similar to those witnessed in the US. Ap Gwilym et al. (2004) results.
An important advantage of the UK dividend growth model is that it does provide a more precise estimate of the equity premium since the variance of the dividend model is considerably smaller than that generated by average returns especially since 1950.
Furthermore fundamentals are less affected by structural shifts in the economic environment than asset prices themselves 8
. Hence, we contend that the implied equity premia derived from these models provide us with better estimates of expected returns than average historical returns. If this is the case then our results suggest that the equity premium puzzle is considerably smaller than generally cited in financial literature. Average historical returns indicate equities have delivered a premium over treasury bills of approaching 8% p.a. since
World War 2, however, the dividend growth model intimates the true expected equity premium is closer to 4.5% p.a.
Could investors in 1950 really have anticipated that stocks would outperform treasury bills by almost 8% p.a. for the rest of the century or expected capital gains to be more than 4% p.a.? Would they have then decided that the risks involved with stocks were too great? If not, then a good deal of realised stock returns are simply due to good luck, that is they were unexpected. In Section 4 we tackle the question of what has caused our actual returns to diverge so far from the expected returns implied by fundamentals during the second half of the 20 th Century. The contention is that a large portion of these substantial capital gains was unanticipated at the beginning of the sample period. Valuation theory, states that this can be caused by either: a) the expected future growth of fundamentals being unusually high, b)
faster growth of fundamentals than expected during the sample period or c) a decline in expected unconditional stock returns during the sample period.
EXPLAINING UK EQUITY RETURNS (i) Are Post-2000 Expected Dividend Growth Rates Unusually High?
It has been argued that we have entered a new economic era, which has enabled higher rates of economic growth to be attained. One claim is that the ever increasing pace of technological developments has facilitated more rapid productivity growth (Jagannathan et al., 2001 ). An alternative argument is that increasing globalisation as witnessed by growing moves towards a truly globally integrated economic system in which resources can be allocated more efficiently due to previous barriers being removed and in which companies are able to locate production internationally in order to minimise costs. A final assertion is that substantial declines in inflation during the latter part of the 20 th Century in many developed economies has set the footing for higher economic growth in the future, economic policymakers have argued. These three factors -technological improvements, globalisation and declining inflation -have lead to hopes that higher levels of economic growth can be achieved and sustained long into the future.
However, if these higher future expected growth rates had not been anticipated at the beginning of our sample period then this would lead to unexpected capital gains being realised by investors as the potential for extended periods of high economic growth became known to investors and incorporated into their expectations. This hypothesis can be tested empirically by examining the in-sample predictability of dividend growth. If a robust relationship between a predictor variable and dividend growth is discovered then we can generate predictions for end of sample dividend growth and assess if these are unusually large.
Firstly, we examine the predictability of the dividend growth rate from variables known in advance in a similar manner to Fama-French (2002) . We first select variables which have been documented in the literature to have explanatory power over future returns and which are available for our whole sample. These are: i) the lagged dividend-price ratio 
We split our dataset into the pre-1950 and post-1951 sub-samples. The rationale behind this is that we are trying to uncover the difference in the behaviour of the equity premium over the first half of the 20 th century when dividend growth and average returns provided similar equity premium estimates and the second half of the 20 th century when these methods provided divergent estimates of stock returns.
[INSERT Furthermore both the lagged dividend price ratio and one period lagged return are statistically significant from zero at the 1% significance level. However, the dividend-price ratio has a positive sign contrary to our expectation that dividends should help move the dividend-price ratio towards its mean value.
The moderate R 2 values obtained but few statistically significant co-efficients is symptomatic of multi-collinearity between some of the predictor variables, which would bias downwards the t-statistics. Consequently we extend our analysis to consider bi-variate regressions using (5), which should give us a much clearer indication of whether or not a relationship between the variables actually exists. We now focus individually on the dividendprice ratio and the one period lagged dividend growth 
In contrast with previous regression results, when we use (5) we find some statistical evidence of predictability using the dividend price ratio. ) tends to zero. However, contrary to our expectations, at the two year and five year horizons the co-efficient on the dividend-price ratio is positive but insignificant.
Thus, we find that over the past fifty years the dividend-price ratio and future dividend growth are essentially unrelated.
Our results from Panel A of Table 3 did indicate that perhaps lagged dividend growth might be able to predict future dividend growth. Furthermore the field research of Lintner (1956) suggests a positive autoregressive process since dividends seem to partially adjust each year towards an optimal level. Table 3 The lagged dividend growth model performs extremely poorly with a tiny R 2 and insignificant co-efficients on the independent variable. Consequently, the pre-1950 data doesn't support there being any link between lagged dividend growth and future dividend growth.
[INSERT .
In fact, the model is unable to explain almost any of the fluctuation in the dividend growth rate. These findings are consistent with those found for the market as a whole reported in Table 3 Panel B. However, Panel B of Table 4 indicates that at the industry level there is a significant positive relationship between lagged dividend growth and future dividend at the two-year and five-year horizons. Nevertheless, lagged dividends are unable to predict more than 2% of the variation of future dividend growth at any horizon.
Overall, our results indicate that at longer horizons of five-years or more dividend growth is essentially unpredictable. Individually, neither the lagged dividend-price ratio nor lagged dividends are able to explain a substantive proportion of future dividend growth at the fiveyear horizon. In this case it would appear that the historical average rate of dividend growth is likely to be the best predictor of future dividend growth. Since 1951, we know this has averaged 1.39% p.a., which is not exceptionally high and we find no evidence to suggest that future long-term dividend growth is liable to be extraordinarily rapid.
Even at shorter horizons, where we do detect a significant in-sample relationship between dividend growth and lagged dividend growth, this model does not indicate that future dividend growth is anticipated to be high. At the market level, dividend growth was below its historical average during the sample end years of 2000, 2001 and 2002, consequently extrapolating into the future using the regression results from (5) would imply future dividend growth was anticipated to be below average 13 . Our evidence indicates that the outlook for dividend growth in December 2002 can at best be expected to equal the historical average dividend growth rate. However, in the short-term rational agents might anticipate dividend growth to be even below the historical average. Therefore, we find no evidence whatsoever to support the hypothesis that future UK dividend growth is expected to be exceptionally high.
Consequently, we suggest that the deviation between expected returns implied by dividend growth and average returns must have been caused by a factor other than the anticipation of extraordinarily rapid dividend growth in the post 2002 period.
(ii) Is Dividend Growth 1951-2002 Unexpectedly High?
If dividend growth in the second half of the 20 th Century had been above expectations formed in 1950 then this would lead to an unanticipated rise in equity prices. However, even if in-sample growth had been extraordinarily large then the expected return estimates from 13 We can report that end-of-sample forecasts from lagged returns at either the one or two year horizon prove to be negative as well Out of sample tests will also provide an opportunity to test the claims made by Fama and French (2002, p. 651 ) that the 'historical mean growth rate (of dividends) is a near optimal forecast of future growth.' We test if these claims made by Fama and French hold for the UK market by investigating the out-of-sample forecasting power of the average historical dividend growth rate compared to the dividend-price ratio and lagged dividend growth
14
. We conduct out-of-sample forecasts for both one-year real dividend growth ( t GD ) and two-year average real dividend growth ( t GD2 ) at the market level, since this was the only evidence of in-sample predictability discovered in Section 4.(i). Throughout, our analysis is based purely on data available to the investor at time t.
14 A lagged return model and a random-walk model were also examined. The return model results are similar to the lagged dividend growth model. The results for both these models are available from the authors upon request.
The historical growth rate model simply expects that next periods dividend growth rate is equal to the mean of all previous dividend growth rates: 
Our estimation equation (6) reveals that there is in fact substantial time-variation in β from both models, which is illustrated graphically in figure 3 . The dividend-price ratio should be negatively related to future dividend growth. If the dividend-price ratio is above its mean then future dividend growth should be below average to guide it back to equilibrium. At both the one year and two year horizon, we find that β on the dividend-price ratio does tend to be negative as predicted by theory, particularly up until the mid-1950's
16
. However, β tends to move towards 0 as the sample period progresses, indicating that the relationship between the lagged dividend-price ratio and dividend growth weakens over the sample period.
At the one year horizon though β remains negative until 1998. However, at the two year horizon since the late-1950's β often has a perverse sign if of small magnitude.
15 Consequently our datastream sample is a little too short to effectively assess the forecasting power of various models and we thus focus purely on the Barclays market data. 16 Our in-sample results found B t on D t /P t to be significantly negative for the 1902-1950 period.
[INSERT FIGURE 3: AROUND HERE]
Previous dividend growth should be positively related to future dividend growth.
Dividends tend to adjust only slowly over time and managers only tend to increase dividends at a rate they believe to be sustainable (Lintner, 1956) . Figure 3A indicates that prior to 1940, β on dividend growth was negative at both the one year and the two year horizon contrary to our expectations. At the one year horizon β on dividend growth was positive in each sample ending period since 1940, whereas at the two-year horizon β tends to be small and close to zero during the period 1940-1980. However, at both horizons β is clearly positive and most persistent from the mid-1980's onwards.
[INSERT , where h is the number of steps ahead that are forecast. This new statistic, which follows the t-distribution, is confirmed by monte-carlo simulations to perform better than the original Diebold-Mariano statistic.
We use Harvey et al.'s (1997) Panel B of Table 6 shows that in terms of the modified Diebold-Mariano tests over 1923-1950 all models are found to produce equally accurate forecasts at the two-year horizon.
However, the historical average model is found to produce statistically superior forecasts to the dividend-price and dividend models for both the full sample period and 1951-2001. These results suggest that investors' looking to forecast dividend growth over the medium to longterm in 2001 should use the historical average model because it produces statistically better forecasts than the other models.
Our results support the hypothesis that there is no better forecaster of future dividend growth than its historical average. For forecasts of dividend growth at both the one year and two year horizon over the full sample the historical average model had the lowest meansquared error and mean absolute error. Even during sub-periods, such as for forecasts of one year dividend growth when the dividend-price model provided the lowest performance statistics, the statistical test of equal performance failed to reject the null that both the dividend-price and the historical average model provided forecasts of equal quality.
Consequently our results broadly support Fama and French's supposition that the historical average is the best forecaster of future dividend growth. 
(iii) Have Expected Stock Returns Fallen During 1951-2002?
There are a number of reasons to suggest that the cost of equity capital has fallen over recent decades. For example, increasing openness and integration of international financial markets has perhaps enabled investors to seriously consider investing in countries they would've been reluctant to supply funds to 30 or 40 years ago (Stulz, 1999) . In addition, greater opportunities for portfolio diversification also now exist due to developments in futures and derivatives markets. Bansal and Lundblad (2002) provide evidence that there has been a decline in the conditional volatility of global real cashflow growth rates indicating that the ex ante risk premium on the global market portfolio has dropped considerably. Another factor which may affect expected returns is the decline in transaction costs as pointed out by Aiyagari and Gertler (1993) and Jones (2000) , which has effectively lowered the rate of return demanded by investors.
We examine dividend-price ratios to assess if, in fact, there has been any permanent change in the level of expected returns. Figure 1 shows that there does appear to have been a declining trend in the UK Barclays Dividend-price ratio since the 1980's. In every year since 1992 the UK Barclays dividend-price ratio has been below its historical average of 4.42%, reaching a post-war low of 2.06% in 1999. However, the decline in the UK dividend-price ratio does not appear to be as clearly prevalent or severe as the decline of the US dividend-price ratio. For example, Fama and French's sample finished in 2000, at which point the S&P 500 dividend-price ratio was at an all-time minima of 1.1% and even by the end of 2002 it had remained below 1.5%. Our conjecture is that part of the decline in the US dividend-price ratio can be assigned to a change in the payout policy of American firms that has not been paralleled by their British counterparts 18 . Nevertheless, it appears that since the early 1990's both the UK and the US dividend-price ratio have been fluctuating around a lower mean value. This is indicative that, in fact, the discount rate has fallen.
To test if there has been a permanent fall in the UK dividend-price ratio, we employ the Andrews-Quandt structural stability test. The Andrews-Quandt test assumes the break date is unknown, and calculates the Chow test for every possible break date 19 , selecting the break date that maximises the F-test statistic. The null hypothesis is that there is no structural break, which for our application we are testing if there is any change in the mean of the dividendprice ratio.
As alluded to in section 2.(iii) there are several outlying observations in the Barclays dividend-price ratio. Outliers can seriously damage the ability of structural break tests to correctly detect the true date of the change. Therefore the dividend-price series which has the effects of these outliers neutralised (DPDUM), as outlined in (3) is used in our structural break tests. For our industry data we also correct for the 1974 outlier, induced by the first OPEC oil price shock using the same method as in (3).
[INSERT Table 7 reveals that the Andrews-Quandt test fails to detect a significant break in the mean of the dividend-price ratio during the period 1902 -1951 . However, over the period 1952 -2002 is selected as the break date with a p-value of 0.00, indicating that there has been a permanent decline in the mean of the dividend-price ratio series. Inspection of figure 4, demonstrates the line of best-fit given by (11) for the Barclays dividend-price series fits the data well. This evidence lends support to the hypothesis that expected returns have fallen. The break tests indicate a downward shift in the mean of the dividend-price ratio by approximately 1.5% (the value of B), which is economically substantial particularly given the previous mean of the dividend-price ratio was about 4.5%. 
This finding is consistent with the study of Carlson, Pelz and Wohar (2002) who find support for a single break in the US quarterly dividend-price ratio during the early 1990's.
Since the timing of the breaks in both markets coincide almost exactly this is suggestive that perhaps there were common factors at work in both markets that lead to such shifts.
[
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Panel B of Table 7 suggests the timing of the downward mean break of the Datastream market dividend-price ratio is almost exactly the same as that using the Barclays Data being just one year later in 1993. We also find support for a statistically significant downward mean break in a majority of the industry dividend-price ratios. In four of the eight industries this occured in 1992 or 1993, while the non-cyclical consumer goods industry had a statistically significant downward break after 1984, a little before the market as a whole.
Dividend-price ratio with 1994 break 1994 1994 is 0 for t 1993 and 1 for t 1994. 
In figure 5 we plot the industry dividend-price ratios with fitted lines given by (12) Our evidence broadly supports the notion that future cashflows are being discounted by investors at a lower rate. This case is strongest for the market indices as a whole, however we generally find support for this supposition at the industry level as well. If the discount rate has fallen then rationally valued equities would witness a run-up in prices during the late 20 th Century, due to factors not anticipated by investors
20
. Consequently realised historical returns could be substantially above investors expectations and the true ex-ante equity premia might be considerably below the 6-8% estimates based upon historical average returns.
We propose this fall in expected returns could potentially be attributed to several factors:
greater openness of international financial markets, increased opportunities for portfolio diversification or declining transaction and information costs. We leave the avenue open for further research to attempt to pinpoint the exact cause of the decline in expected returns. Our main conclusion is purely that there is good reason to believe that expected stock returns have declined towards the end of the 20 th Century. Such a decline in expected returns could rationally explain why stock prices rose so rapidly during the 1990's and why realised returns over the period 1951-2000 have exceeded investors' expected returns as proxied for by the dividend growth model.
CONCLUSION
The empirical work in this paper suggests that the annual expected market equity premium was most likely to be in the region of 4.60%, our estimate of the dividend growth model rather than the 7.79% investors' actually received. We document for the overall market that the pace of capital gains has been dramatically higher since 1951 than the period prior preceding 1950. Our industry data also indicates that capital gains have been high since 1966 across economic sectors, with 6 of the 8 industries reporting an annual rate of capital gain of above 4%. Such large capital gains are thought to have been largely unanticipated by economic agents and certainly it cannot be justified by in-sample growth of dividends over the latter part of the 20 th Century.
We contend that the average stock return over the latter part of the 20 th Century was above investors' expectations and investigate if this was due to either a) expectations of higher growth rates of fundamentals post-2002 or b) a decline in the discount rate. Some evidence of in-sample dividend growth predictability at one or two year horizons is discovered. Since 1951, lagged dividend growth is found to be significantly and positively related to dividend growth at the market level. However, since 2000 dividend growth has been below its long-run average; thus, this model suggests investors should expect lower than average dividend growth in the future. At the industry level pooled regressions indicate only a tiny portion of future dividend growth can be predicted in-sample. Out-of-sample the historical dividend growth rate is the best forecaster of future dividend growth, especially since 1951 and especially for horizons longer than one year. Since the historical dividend growth is the best forecaster then investors should expect dividend growth rates to be approximately the same as in the past. In short, we find no evidence whatsoever to support the view that future dividend growth should be any higher than its historical average.
We do find support for the hypothesis that expected returns have fallen. There does appear to have been a permanent decline in the market dividend-price ratio as identified by the structural stability tests. Our evidence also suggests that this occurred across a range of economic sub-sectors, rather than simply being confined to or caused by extraordinary behaviour in a single industry. This indicates that the expected unconditional equity return has fallen. We propose that this is the primary cause of the high level of capital growth witnessed in recent decades, which we believe to have been largely unanticipated by potential investors.
An important implication is that unless UK investors believe that valuation ratios will fall substantially again, they should expect lower returns in the future. The regression intercept is constant and t-value is the regression co-efficient divided by its standard error. The nominal value of the equity price index and the nominal dividend paid at the end of year t are d t and p t . The price level at the end of year t is CPI t .
The real one year dividend growth rate for year t is GD t = (d t /d t-1 )*(CPI t-1 /CPI t )-1.
The real two-year average dividend growth rate is
The real five-year average dividend growth rate is GD5 t = [(d t+4 /d t-1 )*(CPI t-1 /CPI t+4 )-1]/5 D t-1 / P t-1 is the real dividend-price ratio at the end of period t-1. R t-1 is the realised return at time t-1. F t-1 is the real return on Treasury Bills during time t-1. The regression intercept is constant and t-value is the regression co-efficient divided by its standard error. The nominal value of the equity price index and the nominal dividend paid at the end of year t are d t and p t . The price level at the end of year t is CPI t .
The real five-year average dividend growth rate is GD5 t = [(d t+4 /d t-1 )*(CPI t-1 /CPI t+4 )-1]/5 D t-1 / P t-1 is the real dividend-price ratio at the end of period t-1. R t-1 is the realised return at time t-1. F t-1 is the real return on Treasury Bills during time t-1. Notes: UK data is from Barclays equity-gilt study, US data is from Robert Shiller's website. 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 UK Dividend-price ratio w ith 4 Dummies Fitted D/P constant break in 1993 
